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Summary: UN sanctions have been widely used in the last few de-
cades, raising a number of legal questions, particularly since they 
have been imposed on targeted individuals. Listed people have in-
deed complained of human rights violations and of the unavailability 
of effective remedies.
The case examined here is that of Mr Nada, a man listed under Resolu-
tion 1267 of the sanctions regime in 2001, and who was consequently 
subjected to a travel ban and a freezing of assets. The Swiss Federal 
Court took a traditional position by judging in 2007 that Switzerland, by 
implementing Security Council resolutions, did not violate Mr Nada’s hu-
man rights. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) took a differ-
ent approach, continuing the trend of several international courts which 
have taken more progressive stances on similar questions in order to pro-
tect the human rights of listed people. By reviewing the national imple-
mentation of targeted sanctions and examining ways to harmonise obli-
gations under different regimes, the ECtHR both protected human rights 
and strengthened a workable method to deal with fragmentation.
1. Introduction
Measures of a non-military nature have been widely used by the 
United Nations (UN) in the last 20 years against states or more recently 
against individuals who are allegedly threats to international peace and 
security. These sanctions have been the source of many debates, for ex-
ample with regards to their humanitarian consequences,1 their effi cien-
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Scholar at the Lauterpacht Center for International Law (Cambridge). I would like to thank 
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1 See for example Marc Bossuyt, ‘The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on 
the Enjoyment of Human Rights’ (2000) Working Paper prepared for the Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, ECOSOC, 52nd Session of the Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (21 June 2000) E/CN.4/
Sub.2/2000/33; Jean Drèze and Haris Gazdar, ‘Hunger and Poverty in Iraq, 1991’ (1992) 
20 World Development 921.
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cy,2 the legislative powers of the Security Council (UNSC),3 or their effects 
on the civil liberties of the targeted individuals.4 Listed people have in-
deed complained of human rights violations and of the unavailability of 
effective remedies. National and regional courts, as well as human rights 
bodies, have had to deal with such cases.
The case examined here is that of Mr Nada, a man listed under the 
UNSC resolution 1267 sanctions regime in 2001, and who was conse-
quently subjected to a travel ban and a freezing of his assets. Over the 
years, Mr Nada took administrative and legal actions to challenge the 
listing and the measures applied against him, but without success, until 
he was fi nally delisted by the UNSC Sanctions Committee in 2009. In 
2007, the Swiss Federal Court judged that Switzerland had not violated 
Mr Nada’s human rights. In 2008, Mr Nada brought a case to the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (hereinafter ECtHR or the Court), a case 
which was heard before the Grand Chamber in March 2011. The judg-
ment was issued in September 2012.
Recently, courts have taken a more progressive stance than the 
Swiss Federal Court did in the case of Mr Nada. Indeed, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Kadi case,5 the Canadian Federal Court in 
the Abdelrazik case,6 the Human Rights Committee (HRC) in the Vinck 
and Sayadi v Belgium case7 and the ECtHR in the Al-Jedda case8 agreed 
to review the substance of the alleged breaches and concluded on the 
existence of human rights violations. In view of this jurisprudential ten-
dency, but taking into account the particulars of the present case, it is 
interesting to analyse the approach followed by the ECtHR and to ex-
amine the conclusions it reached. To do so, the present article starts by 
2  See for example Kimberly Ann Elliott, ‘The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely 
Empty?’ (1998) 23 International Security 50; Robert A Pape, ‘Why Economic Sanctions Do 
Not Work’ (1997) 22 International Security 90.
3  This is a major issue with regards to UNSC Res 1373 (28 September 2001) but not for the 
case studied here which is based on UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999). See for example 
Matthew Happold, ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United 
Nations’ (2003) 16 LJIL 593; Paul C Szasz, ‘The Security Council Starts Legislating’ (2002) 
96 AJIL 901.
4  Steven Dewulf and Didier Pacquée, ‘Protecting Human Rights in the War on Terror: Chal-
lenging the Sanctions Regime Originating from Resolution 1267 (1999)’ (2006) 24 NQHR 
607, 608.
5  Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat Inter-
national Foundation v Council of the European Union and Commission of the European Com-
munities [2008] ECR I-06351 (ECJ, Kadi).
6  Abousfi an Abdelrazik v The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Attorney General of Canada 
(4 June 2009) 2009 FC 580 (Federal Court of Canada).
7  Nabil Sayadi and Patricia Vinck v Belgium, Communication No1472/2006 (22 October 
2008) (Human Rights Committee).
8  Al-Jedda v UK App no 27021/08 (ECHR 7 July 2011).
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introducing the UNSC sanctions regime, the general facts of the Nada 
case and the conclusions of the Swiss Federal Court (2). Then, the ap-
proaches open to the Court to fi nd itself competent are presented before 
the one preferred here is examined (3). In a third part, the infringements 
of human rights at stake are considered (4). To conclude, the importance 
of this judgment, the fi rst one where targeted sanctions were brought 
under the scrutiny of the ECtHR, is highlighted, as it represents a mile-
stone in the methodology to balance confl icting obligations and confi rms 
that the ECtHR is moving away, as already witnessed in Al-Jedda, from 
total deference to the UNSC (5).
2. Framework
A. UNSC sanctions
1. Introduction to the sanctions regimes
By virtue of article 41 of the United Nations Charter (UNC), the 
UNSC can take any measure not involving recourse to armed force to 
react to threats to peace, breaches to peace and acts of aggression. Such 
measures include, non-exhaustively, ‘complete or partial interruption of 
economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio and 
other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic rela-
tions’.9 Other pressure mechanisms have been developed, such as arms 
embargoes, the reduction or severance of diplomatic relations, the freez-
ing of assets, or travel bans.10
Over time, sanctions have been taken against a number of states,11 
specifi c individuals belonging to governmental circles of states12 and, more 
recently, people suspected of involvement in terrorism.13 As the UNSC has 
declared that international terrorism is a threat to international peace 
9  Charter of the United Nations (signed 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 
1 UNTS XVI art 41; Terry D Gill, ‘Legal and Some Political Limitations on the Power of the 
UN Security Council to Exercise its Enforcement Powers under Chapter VII of the Charter’ 
(1995) 26 NYIL 33, 48-50; Bibi van Ginkel, The Practice of the UN in Combating Terrorism 
from 1946 to 2008: Question of Legality and Legitimacy (Intersentia 2010) 110-114.
10  Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Sanctions Regimes under Article 41 of the UN Charter’ in Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative 
Study (Nijhoff 2004) 3, 6-7.
11  On sanctions regimes against states, see for example Gowlland-Debbas (n 10) 7-8.
12  On sanctions regimes against states’ offi cials, see for example Alain Tehindrazanarivelo, 
‘Le droit des Nations Unies et les limites au pouvoir de sanction du Conseil de sécurité’ in 
Laura Picchio Forlati and Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos (eds), Les sanctions économiques en 
droit international - Académie de Droit International de la Haye (Nijhoff 2004) 211, 257.
13  Tehindrazanarivelo (n 12) 256.
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and security,14 its actions towards suppressing it fall under Chapter VII 
and are consequently mandatory for all states parties to the UN.15
2. (De)listing procedures
The sanctions regime examined here was created by UNSC resolu-
tion 1267, adopted in 1999 in response inter alia to the continued safe 
haven offered by the Taliban to Bin Laden and to the attacks on Ameri-
can embassies in Tanzania and Kenya.16 It was strengthened and modi-
fi ed by several subsequent UNSC resolutions, particularly resolutions 
1333 and 1390. It targets Al-Qaida and the Taliban as well as associated 
individuals and entities, originally based in Afghanistan, but now also 
wherever they are located.17 The sanctions include the freezing of assets 
and travel bans.18 
These restrictions target all individuals and entities placed on the 
‘consolidated list’ by a Sanctions Committee created under the UNSC 
resolution and responsible for maintaining this list.19 The fi fteen mem-
bers of the UNSC sit on this Sanctions Committee and are empowered 
to determine who is to be blacklisted on the basis of nominations by any 
state party to the UN.20 Guidelines published at the request of the UNSC21 
confi rm the discretionary power of the Sanctions Committee: no criteria 
are provided to clarify on which basis the listing and delisting decisions 
are made.22 Ending up on a list is surprisingly easy: following nomina-
tion by a state of a person or entity, listing occurs if no state sitting on 
14  In UNSC Res 1189 (13 August 1998), the UNSC was ‘convinced that the suppression of 
acts of international terrorism is essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security’, which it reaffi rmed in UNSC Res 1267 (1999).
15  Charter of the United Nations arts 25 and 48.
16  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) Preamble; Dewulf and Pacquée (n 4) 611; Yvonne Terlingen, ‘The 
United States and the UN’s Targeted Sanctions of Suspected Terrorists: What Role for Hu-
man Rights?’ (2010) 24 Ethics & International Affairs 1, 2.
17  Noah Birkhäuser, ‘Sanctions of the Security Council Against Individuals: Some Hu-
man Rights Problems’ 5 <http://www.statewatch.org/terrorlists/docs/Birkhauser.PDF> 
accessed 28 September 2012; Dewulf and Pacquée (n 4) 611-613; Gowlland-Debbas (n 10) 
15. ‘[A]ssociated with’ was clarifi ed in UNSC Res 1617 (29 July 2005) para 2 with a very 
full defi nition.
18  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) para 4; UNSC Res 1333 (19 December 2000) para 8c; UNSC Res 
1390 (28 January 2002) para 2a for assets freezing; UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 2b for the 
travel ban.
19  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) para 6; UNSC Res 1333 (2000) paras 8c and 16b.
20  Terlingen (n 16) 2.
21  UNSC request found in UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 5d; Guidelines to the Committee 
for the Conduct of its Work, adopted on 7 November 2002 and last amended 26 January 
2011. 
22  Ginkel (n 9) 240; Gowlland-Debbas (n 10) 18.
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the Sanctions Committee challenges it within a short period of time.23 
Nomination is based on intelligence reports containing sometimes vague 
suspicions rather than proofs.24 Detailed reasons which have led to a 
listing do not have to be publicised - outside a ‘narrative description’ of 
reasons when possible.25 
As for delisting, consensus between all states members of the Sanc-
tions Committee and agreement of the nominating state are needed.26 No 
reason is required to justify disagreement with such removal. Until re-
cently, the only way for listed people to challenge the measures imposed 
on them was to ask their state of nationality or residence to represent 
them before the Sanctions Committee, which no state was obliged to do. 
The creation of a Focal Point27 and later the appointment of an Ombud-
sperson28 now allow people to start a procedure in their own name. A 
review of all names was to take place by 30 June 2010 and since then a 
regular review has been required.29 
B. Facts of the Nada case 
Mr Nada, an Egyptian-Italian national, was subjected to targeted 
sanctions from November 2001, when he was added to the consolidated 
list,30 to March 2010, when removed. During that time, he lived in an 
Italian enclave within Swiss territory and was not allowed to move from 
that municipality. Indeed, Switzerland, implementing UNSC resolution 
1390, refused to allow Mr Nada to enter into or transit through its ter-
ritory, at least from October 2003 - it had not revoked Mr Nada’s permit 
before that time. His bank accounts and assets were also frozen, in ac-
cordance with resolutions 1333 and 1390. Swiss implementation took 
place through an executive order (the Swiss ordinance).31
23  Iain Cameron, ‘UN Targeted Sanctions, Legal Safeguards and the European Convention 
on Human Rights’ (2003) 72 Nordic Journal of International Law 159, 166.
24  Intelligence reports have sometimes been criticised for their lack of substance. See Cam-
eron (n 23) 168; Dewulf and Pacquée (n 4) 620.
25  Guidelines (n 21) para 6b; UNSC Res 1822 (30 June 2008) para 12; Dewulf and Pacquée 
(n 4) 620.
26  Terlingen (n 16) 3.
27  Created under UNSC Res 1730 (19 December 2006).
28  UNSC Res 1904 (19 December 2009) paras 20-27.
29  UNSC Res 1822 (2008) paras 25-26; UNSC Res 1904 (2009) para 32.
30  UN Press Release, ‘Security Council Committee Concerning Afghanistan issues further 
addendum’ (9 November 2001) AFG/163 SC/7206.
31  ‘Ordonnance instituant des mesures à l’encontre de personnes et entités liées à Ous-
sama ben Laden, au groupe ‘Al Qaida’ ou aux Taliban’ (2 October 2000) (Swiss ordinance) 
arts 3 and 4(a). It was enacted fi rst on the basis of art 184 of the Constitution (Mathias-
Charles Krafft, Daniel Thürer and Julie-Antoinette Stadelhofer, ‘National Studies - Switzer-
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Exemptions for judicial reasons or, with agreement from the Sanc-
tions Committee, for medical, humanitarian or religious reasons, were 
planned in the relevant resolutions32 and were included in the Swiss 
ordinance.33 The federal offi ce of migrations granted exemptions for ju-
dicial procedures on two of the six occasions requested. Mr Nada did 
not use them because, according to him, they were too short for a man 
of his age to take the trips and he would have risked not respecting the 
prescribed time allowance.34 
The investigation undertaken by the prosecutor’s offi ce of the Swiss 
Confederation closed in 2005, with nothing found to charge Mr Nada 
of supporting a criminal organisation. Italy also started and closed an 
investigation for similar reasons.35 However, this did not change his sta-
tus as a blacklisted person, nor consequently the sanctions applied to 
him.36 He unsuccessfully requested delisting and the lifting of sanctions 
at both national and international levels.37 His name was fi nally removed 
from the international list in 2009 without any reason given, and also, 
shortly after, from the Swiss ordinance.38
Mr Nada’s last request to the Swiss Federal Council to be delisted 
was transferred to the Swiss Federal Court which issued its judgment 
in November 2007, rejecting Mr Nada’s claim on the basis of a three-fold 
argumentation line. First, Switzerland, as a party of the UN, is bound 
to implement UNSC resolutions; in case of confl ict of rules, this obliga-
tion takes precedence over others. Second, the only exception would be if 
land’ in Vera Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A 
Comparative Study (Nijhoff 2004) 523, 531-532) and then of ‘Loi fédérale sur l’application 
de sanctions internationales’ (Loi sur les embargos, LEmb) (22 March 2002, état le 27 July 
2004) 946.231).
32  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) para 4b for exemptions to assets freezing on humanitarian 
grounds; UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 2b for exemptions to travel ban on judicial grounds 
or others, decided on a case-by-case basis by the Sanctions Committee.
33  According to art 4(a) al 2 of the Swiss ordinance (n 31), the federal offi ce of migrations 
can grant exemptions for judicial procedures.
34  Nada v Switzerland Public Audience before the ECtHR, webcast (23 March 2011).
35  Parliamentary Assembly, ‘UN Security Council and European Union blacklists’ (22 Jan-
uary 2008) Doc. 11454 Addendum, para 6.
36  Parliamentary Assembly - Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘UN Security 
Council and Human Rights: introductory memorandum’ (19 March 2007) AS/Jur (2007) 
14 para 2.
37  Youssef Moustafa Nada contre la Suisse Requête no 10593/08 (19 February 2008), Ex-
posé des Faits (17 March 2009) paras 1-3.
38  Security Council News Press ‘Security Council Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Commit-
tee Removes Names of Three Entities from Consolidated List’ (11 March 2010) SC/9877; 
‘Ordonnance instituant des mesures à l’encontre de personnes et entités liées à Oussama 
ben Laden, au groupe ‘Al Qaida’ ou aux Taliban’, Modifi cation du 22 March 2010; Nada v 
Switzerland App no 10593/08 (ECHR 12 September 2012) para 62.
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the confl icting rules were jus cogens rules, which was not the case here. 
Third, Switzerland had no margin of manoeuvre in the implementation 
of these UN sanctions.39
Following this ruling against him and since Switzerland is a mem-
ber of the Council of Europe (CoE), Mr Nada brought a case before the 
ECtHR alleging that his rights under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights (ECHR) had been breached by Switzerland.40 The case was 
heard by the Grand Chamber in March 2011 and the judgment issued in 
September 2012.
C. Main conclusions of the Swiss Federal Court
1. Obligation to implement UNSC resolutions over other obligations
The central argument of the Swiss Federal Court was that since 
Switzerland is a party of the UN,41 it is bound to accept and implement 
the obligations found in the Charter, as well as UNSC resolutions.42
More generally, member states to any treaty are bound, under the 
pacta sunt servanda principle, to comply with the obligations they have 
undertaken. In the case of the UNC, this is reinforced by the fact that in 
some cases even non-parties can be bound by the principles enunciated 
in article 2.43 Also, ‘[t]he Members of the United Nations agree to accept 
and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with 
the present Charter’.44 The UNSC is granted primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security and, in doing so, 
it acts on member states’ behalf.45 Its decisions and those of its subsidi-
ary organs taken under chapter VII are binding on all or some member 
states, depending on the wording of the resolution.46 The Sanctions Com-
mittee was created according to resolution 1267, passed under chapter 
VII, so the member states are bound to implement its decisions.
39  Youssef Mustapha Nada gegen SECO, Staatssekretariat für Wirtschaft (14 November 
2007) 1A.45/2007/daa (Swiss Federal Court).
40  That the review is against the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR), not the 
Swiss Constitution is important to keep in mind, because the rights and freedoms protected 
do not totally overlap, ie the Swiss Constitution protects the right to property under art 26, 
but the country has not ratifi ed the ECHR Protocol 1.
41  Switzerland has been party to the UN since 2002.
42  Nada gegen SECO (n 39) para 5.
43  Charter of the United Nations art 2(6); Gill (n 9) 48.
44  Charter of the United Nations art 25.
45  Charter of the United Nations art 24(1).
46  Charter of the United Nations art 48.
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Since 1974, Switzerland has been a party to the ECHR, which cre-
ates obligations, as member states must secure for everyone under their 
jurisdiction the rights found in the Convention.47 While Switzerland has 
to respect the obligations fl owing from this latter treaty, if international 
rules confl ict, the obligations under the UNC shall prevail.48 Indeed, arti-
cle 103 of the UNC provides that in the case of a confl ict of rules, the ob-
ligations fl owing from the Charter take precedence over any other obliga-
tions that states might have under international law. This is also stated 
in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in the successive 
treaties article, which is a reminder of the special status of the UNC to 
which the normal provisions on the confl ict of rules do not apply.49
2. Limits to the UNSC powers when acting under chapter VII50
It is widely agreed that the UNSC is bound by jus cogens and must 
respect the purposes and principles of the Charter.51 The latter means 
that, to some extent, the UNSC must take human rights into account 
while making decisions.52 
The only exception to the supremacy of the UNSC resolutions ac-
cepted by the Swiss Federal Court would have been if the human rights 
in question were rules of jus cogens. The UN organs are indeed obliged to 
respect these without any derogation being possible; UN primacy is to be 
curbed when the rules confl icting with the resolutions are peremptory 
norms.53 As expressed by ad-hoc Judge Lauterpacht: 
47  ECHR art 1.
48  Charter of the United Nations art 103; Rudolf Bernhardt, ‘Article 103’ in Bruno Simma 
(ed), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (vol II, OUP 2002) 1295ff; Nada gegen 
SECO (n 39) para 6.
49  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 22 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 (VCLT) art 30.
50  Chapter VII only applies if the UNSC decides the situation is serious enough to amount to 
a threat to international peace and security (Charter of the United Nations art 39). Discussing 
whether the UNSC made such a decision on valid grounds falls beyond the scope of this ar-
ticle and is not a controversial question in most opinions about sanctions regimes. For some 
remarks on the topic, see Gill (n 9) 39-46; Ginkel (n 9) 108-110; Tehindrazanarivelo (n 12) 
213-214, 244-247; Sir Michael Wood, ‘The UN Security Council and International Law’ (Her-
sch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures 2006, University of Cambridge) 4-5 <http://www.lcil.
cam.ac.uk/Media/lectures/pdf/2006_hersch_lecture_1.pdf> accessed 28 September 2012.
51  Charter of the United Nations art 24(2); Wood (n 50) 3. 
52  On the basis of the Charter of the United Nations art 24(2) in conjunction with art 1(3) (pro-
motion of human rights) and art 2(2) (good faith) and because the UNSC affi rmed that ‘States 
must ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with all their obligations un-
der international law, and should adopt such measures in accordance with international law, 
in particular international human rights’ (UNSC Res 1456 (20 January 2003) para 6).
53  VCLT art 53; International Law Commission, ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study 
Group on the Fragmentation of International Law: Diffi culties Arising from the Diversifi ca-
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[t]he relief which Article 103 of the Charter may give the Security 
Council in case of confl ict between one of its decisions and an op-
erative treaty obligation cannot - as a matter of simple hierarchy of 
norms - extend to a confl ict between a Security Council resolution 
and jus cogens.54 
The Swiss Federal Court considered that the right to an effective 
remedy is not a norm of jus cogens and that while the interdiction of tor-
ture is,55 it is not applicable to the facts of the case. No defi nite criteria 
to defi ne peremptory norms or lists thereof have been put together. How-
ever, the right to an effective remedy cannot be considered as jus cogens, 
particularly as it can be derogated in case of emergency.56 Indeed, any 
such right falls out of that category,57 as derogability contradicts the ‘ab-
solute prohibition of any form of violation [of the norms of jus cogens]’.58 
3. No legal discretion in implementation
Since states have to transpose resolutions into domestic measures, 
they sometimes benefi t from a margin of appreciation at that stage.59 If 
such discretion exists, states must apply their obligations under the UN 
in a way that allows respect of other obligations and are responsible for 
their failure to do so.60
tion and Expansion of International Law’ (2006) para 40. Doctrine and jurisprudence have 
also used this argument. See Case T-315/01 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Council and Commis-
sion [2005] ECR II-03649, para 226; D c Département fédéral de l’économie, 2A.785/2006 (23 
January 2008) (Swiss Federal Court) paras 7.3-8.4; Karl Doehring, ‘Unlawful Resolutions of 
the Security Council and their Legal Consequences’ (1997) 1 MPYUNL 91, 104-105; Gill (n 9) 
71; August Reinisch, ‘Developing Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the 
Security Council for the Imposition of Economic Sanctions’ (2001) 95 AJIL 851, 859.
54  Case concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, ICJ Reports 1993, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 325, 440 para 100. As presented by Birkhäuser (n 
17) 12 (emphasis added).
55  Nada gegen SECO (n 39) para 7.3. In agreement with doctrinal views on the question. 
See for example Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (CUP 2005) 11; Erika de Wet, 
‘The Prohibition of Torture as an International Norm of Jus Cogens and its Implications in 
National and International Law’ (2004) 15 EJIL 97, 98.
56  Indeed, it is not listed under ECHR art 15(2).
57  As can be understood from VCLT art 53, a rule of jus cogens is a ‘norm accepted and 
recognised by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted’.
58  Wladyslaw Czapliński, ‘Jus Cogens and the Law of Treaties’ in Christian Tomuschat and 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin (eds), The Fundamental Rules of the International Legal Order: Jus 
Cogens and Obligations Erga Omnes (Nijhoff 2006) 81, 87.
59  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘An Effective Remedy for Josef K: Canadian Judge “Defi es” 
Security Council Sanctions through Interpretation’ (EJIL: Talk! 19 June 2009).
60  Daniel Frank, ‘UNO-Sanktionen gegen Terrorismus und Europäische Menschenrech-
tskonvention (EMRK)’ in Stephen Breitenmoser and others (eds), Human Rights, Democracy 
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With regards to the type of sanctions used, the Swiss Federal Court 
considered that Switzerland was implementing measures clearly detailed 
in the relevant resolutions, hence leaving no discretion to the states.61 
The UNSC made clear that all states shall ‘freeze funds and other fi nan-
cial resources’ of a number of people listed62 and ‘prevent the entry into 
or the transit through their territories of these [listed] individuals’.63
As to whom is targeted, the Sanctions Committee maintains the list, 
so states have no power of their own except through membership in the 
Committee, or as state of residence or nationality, through petitioning. 
Switzerland was in none of these positions.
3. Approaches open to the ECtHR
Depending on the weight given by the Court to some of its jurispru-
dential milestones and to the global judicial debate which surrounds the 
question of UNSC sanctions, several approaches could realistically have 
been considered in the Nada case. The fi rst one could have been based 
on the Behrami and Saramanti case, with the refusal to look at equiva-
lence of protection (A). The second approach could have been inspired 
by more recent judgments, whether at the ECJ or the ECtHR; one can 
consider the interest respectively of a strong dualist approach or a har-
monious interpretation angle in the present case (B). The option chosen 
by the ECtHR, quite promising and partly in line with the judicial trend, 
is also presented below (C).
A. Equivalence doctrine except for UNSC resolutions 
1. Equivalence doctrine
As stated in the Bosphorus case, the ECHR regime has no problem 
with the fact that, for means of cooperation, states enter into internation-
al agreements and thus transfer sovereign powers to an international 
organisation.64 However, the contracting party stays responsible under 
and the Rule of Law: Liber amicorum Luzius Wildhaber (Dike/Nomos 2007) 237, 247; Bos-
phorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland App no 45036/98 (ECHR 30 
June 2005) para 157.
61  This sanctions regime is recognised as allowing no margin of appreciation at the dif-
ference of the regime under UNSC Res 1373 (2001): Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v 
European Commission [2010] ECR II-05177 (General Court, Kadi II) paras 28-31 and paras 
86-88.
62  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) para 4b; UNSC Res 1333 (2000) para 8c.
63  UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 2b.
64  Bosphorus (n 60) para 152; for an overview of the evolution in the ECtHR declarations 
of competence regarding the acts of international organisations, see Kathrin Kuhnert, ‘Bos-
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the Convention ‘for all acts and omissions of its organs, regardless of 
whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic 
law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations’.65 
To decide whether a state’s action benefi ts from immunity of review 
by the Court because it fl ows from an international organisation, the 
Court usually follows a line of thought based on the ‘equivalence’ argu-
ment, quite similar to the Solange principle.66 If the international organi-
sation from which legal obligations originate protects human rights in a 
manner equivalent to that of the ECHR, then a presumption of the state’s 
compliance with the Convention is applied.67 Reversely, ‘[p]resumption of 
equivalence may be rebutted if the protection provided by the other or-
ganisation is “manifestly defi cient” on the facts of the particular case’.68
2. Exception for UNSC resolutions
In its Behrami and Saramanti cases, the Court pointed out that the 
responsibility of the UNSC with regards to peace and security is unique 
and declared that:
the Convention [ECHR] cannot be interpreted in a manner which 
would subject the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties which 
are covered by UNSC resolutions and occur prior to or in the course 
of such missions, to the scrutiny of the Court.69 
Hence, in past cases, the ECtHR brushed aside its equivalence doc-
trine and refused to review the legality under the Convention of acts 
implementing a UNSC resolution, according to the opinion that they are 
protected by the cover of article 103.
phorus: Double Standards in European Human Rights Protection?’ (2006) 2 Utrecht Law 
Papers 177.
65  Bosphorus (n 60) para 153.
66  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Kadi II: The 1267 Sanctions Regime (Back) Before the Gen-
eral Court of EU’ (EJIL: Talk! 16 November 2010). Indeed, if the higher level of jurisdiction 
adopts similar safeguards than the lower level would provide (here respectively the UNSC 
and ECHR), then the lower level presumes conformity and desists (Solange II). However, 
if the higher level of jurisdiction fails to do so, then the lower level has a right of review 
(Solange I).
67  Bosphorus (n 60) paras 154-155. 
68  David John Harris, Michael O’Boyle and Colin Warbrick, Law of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (Butterworths 2009) 29.
69  Behrami & Behrami v France and Saramanti v France, Germany and Norway App no 
71412/01 and 78166/01 (ECHR 2 May 2007) paras 148-149.
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B. Recent judicial trends 
1. Kadi and strong dualism
Another possibility would have been, in a Kadi type of reasoning, for 
the ECtHR to decide to verify the conformity of the national measures 
with the ECHR, based on the idea that such a ‘task remains unaffected 
by whether the State in question is acting in conformity with its other 
obligations including obligations under the United Nations Charter’.70
In the Kadi case, the ECJ reaffi rmed the primacy of UNSC resolu-
tions, but also acknowledged its competence to review whether the EC 
Regulation implementing the UNSC resolutions71 respected the funda-
mental rights which are part of the constitutional guarantees found in 
the EC Treaty.72 It stated that it only reviews the conformity of the im-
plementation acts with fundamental rights, not with the UNSC resolu-
tions themselves.73 This judgment affi rmed the existence of a European 
separate legal order with constitutional rules which must be respected 
in all EC Regulations. The ECJ has the responsibility to verify this con-
formity in any case, whatever international obligations the Regulations 
are implementing.74
Aside from the substantive criticism formulated against this judg-
ment,75 it is possible that the ECtHR has seen this line of reasoning 
as unfi t to apply to the present case because of differences in the legal 
orders.76 The ECJ declared that it could verify the implementing Regu-
lation’s compatibility with fundamental rights as found under EU law 
because the European legal order is special and ‘autonomous’;77 respect 
70  Dapo Akande, ‘ECHR Grand Chamber to Hear Case Challenging Legality of UN Security 
Council Sanctions’ (EJIL: Talk! 24 October 2010).
71  Council Regulation (EC) 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specifi c restrictive 
measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, 
the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 
prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the fl ight 
ban and extending the freeze of funds and other fi nancial resources in respect of the Tali-
ban of Afghanistan, OJ L139/9.
72  ECJ, Kadi (n 5) paras 288, 326.
73  ECJ, Kadi (n 5) paras 286-287.
74  ECJ, Kadi (n 5) Summary paras 4, 304, 326.
75  Mainly that the ECJ is doing exactly what it declared it would not do, ie attacking the 
supremacy of the UNSC Resolutions. The ECJ indeed questions the obligation to - by dis-
cussing the states’ right to - implement the Resolutions. General Court, Kadi II (n 61) paras 
115, 121; Albert Posch, ‘The Kadi Case: Rethinking the Relationship Between EU Law and 
International Law’ (2009) 15 Columbia Journal of European Law Online <http://www.cjel.
net/online/15_2-posch/> accessed 28 September 2012.
76  Antonios Tzanakopoulos, ‘Stepping Up the (Dualist?) Resistance: The English High Court 
Quashes Domestic Measures Implementing UN Sanctions’ (EJIL: Talk! 9 October 2009).
77  ECJ, Kadi (n 5) paras 281-284, 316.
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for rules of a constitutional nature is needed for international law to 
pierce the veil. Some commentators expressed doubts that the ECtHR 
could use this argument because ‘it is diffi cult to see that the legal order 
within which the ECtHR operates is one which is independent of general 
law including the UN Charter’.78 Dualism is based on the existence of a 
legal order separate from the international one.
However, one could imagine that the ECtHR wanted to reaffi rm its 
quasi-constitutional role for Europe. Indeed, while the ECHR does not 
create a single legal order for the states parties to it, it is said to be a 
Constitution for Europe.79 If the ECJ affi rmed that the Regulation was to 
be annulled because ‘it violated the basic constitutional Charter of the 
EU’,80 the ECtHR arguably could have reviewed whether a Swiss ordi-
nance and its application breached the constitutional order of the larger 
European area.81 
2. Al-Jedda and systemic interpretation
The approach taken in the more recent Al-Jedda judgment, in which 
the ECtHR demonstrated a strong willingness to fi nd a harmonious so-
lution to prima facie confl icting obligations, is also relevant in the Nada 
case. It indeed shows another trend developed by the ECtHR in its deal-
ing with acts taken to implement a UNSC resolution. 
In Al-Jedda, it is interesting to note that the Court did not follow the 
Kadi line of strong dualism. It rather developed an innovative approach 
based on systemic interpretation. It announced that ‘in interpreting its 
resolutions, there must be a presumption that the Security Council does 
not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to breach fun-
damental principles of human rights’.82 Without asserting that human 
rights obligations could ignore obligations under the UNC and article 
103, the Court made it clear that, as far as legally possible, it would in-
terpret the relevant UNSC resolution in a way that would allow respect 
78  Akande (n 70).
79  Jean-François Flauss, ‘La Cour Européenne des droits de l’homme est-elle une cour 
constitutionnelle ?’ (1999) 36 Revue Francaise du Droit Constitutionnel 711, 721; Steven 
Greer, ‘What’s Wrong with the European Convention on Human Rights?’ (2008) 30 Human 
Rights Quarterly 680, 684.
80  Devika Hovell, ‘A House of Kadis? Recent Challenges to the UN Sanctions Regime and 
the Continuing Response to the ECJ Decision in Kadi’ (EJIL: Talk! 7 July 2009).
81  Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (1995) Series A no 310 (preliminary objections) para 
75; Vera Gowlland-Debbas, ‘Implementing Sanctions Resolutions in Domestic Law’ in Vera 
Gowlland-Debbas (ed), National Implementation of United Nations Sanctions: A Comparative 
Study (Nijhoff 2004) 33, 59.
82  Al-Jedda (n 8) para 102.
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of human rights.83 In practice, it looked at the legal nature in the resolu-
tion of the authorisation/obligation to use internments. The Court found 
that, in its resolution, the UNSC did not create an obligation to use this 
method, which was (only) mentioned in an annexed letter.84 To reach 
such a conclusion, it interpreted the resolution taking into account other 
sources, for example objections by the UN Secretary General to the use 
of internments.85
C. Approach in the Nada case
The Court explained that it had jurisdiction on the basis of a dou-
ble reasoning, related to the competence ratione personae and ratione 
materiae. While it assessed the former in the preliminary objections, it 
examined the latter together with the merits of the alleged violation of 
article 8. In this section, after presenting the arguments that the ECtHR 
considered valid for both aspects (1-2), some remarks are made regard-
ing the basis of competence chosen, where it places this judgment in the 
recent judicial trend and considers what its downsides may be (3).
1. Ratione personae 
Under this fi rst assessment of competence, the Court examined 
whether the measures on which the applicant based his claim were at-
tributable to Switzerland. Rejecting the respondent state’s argument 
that since it was implementing a UNSC resolution it could not be held 
responsible, the ECtHR judged that it was asked to review the national 
implementation of UNSC resolutions. ‘The alleged violations of the Con-
vention are thus attributable to Switzerland’.86
To reach this conclusion, it highlighted the factual differences be-
tween this case and the Behrami and Saramanti cases to which the 
French government, as a third-party intervener, made reference. Where-
as in these latter cases the entities concerned were UNMIK and KFOR,87 
two subsidiary organs of the UNSC whose ‘actions were directly attribut-
able to the UN’,88 the former and present case focused on the implemen-
83  Al-Jedda (n 8) para 102.
84  Al-Jedda (n 8) paras 103-105.
85  Al-Jedda (n 8) paras 40-41; Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 30 
of Resolution 1546 (2004) (7 June 2005) S/2005/373, para 72; Report of the Secretary 
General pursuant to paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004) (3 March 2006) S/2006/137, 
para 54.
86  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) paras 102, 104, 121.
87  Behrami and Saramanti (n 69) para 130; UNMIK was the entity responsible for civil ad-
ministration in Kosovo, and KFOR for security powers in Kosovo.
88  Behrami and Saramanti (n 69) para 151.
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tation of UNSC resolutions at the national level as was required by these 
documents. 
The Court further noted the parallels with the Bosphorus case,89 
where the seizure of an aircraft took place on Irish territory, following 
the decision of a minister and carried out by state offi cials.90 In Nada, 
the acts reproached by the applicant are those of a member state, carried 
out by state offi cials, implementing a Swiss decision;91 they are hence at-
tributable to the Swiss authorities, not to the UN.
2. Ratione materiae
This second assessment of competence focused on the measures 
for which the respondent government was reproached - ie the entry and 
travel ban implemented by Switzerland in application of the relevant 
UNSC resolutions. The Court implicitly examined whether article 103 
was to be applied because of a confl ict of obligations and concluded that 
it was not necessary. 
It started by reaffi rming that a presumption exists that states do not 
enter into new obligations that contradict older ones.92 However, in the 
present case, it appeared that this presumption was proven wrong, since 
the relevant resolutions impose in ‘clear and explicit language […] an obli-
gation to take measures capable of breaching human rights’.93 By making 
reference to such measures as capable of but not automatically breaching 
human rights, the Court left the door open for a volte-face, allowing verifi -
cation of the implementation measures chosen by Switzerland.
Indeed, the Court then examined whether Switzerland had any lati-
tude in implementing its obligations stemming from the UNSC resolu-
tions, latitude which would allow it also to meet its obligations under the 
ECHR.94
The opinion of many instances and of the United Kingdom in its 
third-party intervention is that Switzerland was implementing measures 
clearly detailed in the relevant resolutions, hence leaving no discretion 
89  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 121.
90  Behrami and Saramanti (n 69) para 151; Bosphorus (n 60) para 137. In the latter case, 
measures were taken on the basis of an EC Regulation, itself implementing a UNSC sanc-
tions regime against Yugoslavia. See Frank Schorkopf, ‘The European Court of Human 
Rights Judgement in the Case of Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm v Ireland’ (2005) 6 German 
Law Journal 1255, 1256. 
91  Harris (n 68) 790.
92  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 170.
93  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 172 (emphasis added).
94  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 175.
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to the states.95 The resolutions were unambiguous that all states had 
to freeze funds96 and implement an entry and transit ban97 towards the 
people on the list maintained by the Sanctions Committee.
Nevertheless, the ECtHR considered that some limited but existing 
margin of manoeuvre was left for Switzerland in its implementation of 
the UNSC resolutions.98 In particular, it noted that the ban did ‘not apply 
where entry or transit [was] necessary for the fulfi lment of a judicial proc-
ess…’,99 the term ‘necessary’ providing some fl exibility.100 Also, the UNSC 
[urged] all States to take immediate steps to enforce and strengthen 
through legislative enactments or administrative measures, where 
appropriate, the measures imposed under domestic laws or regula-
tions against their nationals and other individuals or entities operat-
ing on their territory ....101 
In the view of the ECtHR, the use of ‘where appropriate’ also offered 
some room for manoeuvre.102 Finally, mention was made of some latitude 
recently taken in Switzerland with regards to sanctions.103 Indeed, it ap-
pears that following a Parliament motion, sanctions have not been ap-
plied since the end of 2010 against individuals where a certain number 
of conditions are met.104
Hence, the Court judged that Switzerland had some margin of ap-
preciation to implement the UNSC resolutions and went on to assess the 
proportionality of the interference with Mr Nada’s right to liberty.105
95  This sanctions regime is recognised in several opinions as allowing no margin of appre-
ciation for a difference of regime under UNSC Res 1373 (2001): General Court, Kadi II (n 61) 
paras 28-31 and 86-88; Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 111.
96  UNSC Res 1267 (1999) para 4b; UNSC Res 1333 (2000) para 8c.
97  UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 2b.
98  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 180.
99  UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 2b as quoted in Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 177 (em-
phasis added).
100  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 177.
101  UNSC Res 1390 (2002) para 8 as quoted in Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 178 (em-
phasis added).
102  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 178.
103  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 179.
104  Parliamentary Assembly - Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, ‘Information 
note: Compatibility of UN Security Council and EU [terrorist] Black Lists with European 
Convention on Human Rights Requirements’ (7 December 2010) AS/Jur/Inf (2010) 95 6-7. 
The Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the UN in New York informed the Sanctions 
Committee of this political decision. The cumulative conditions are: to have been blacklisted 
for 3 years or more; not to have been brought before a court yet; that no possibility be of-
fered for an international appeal; that no charges be brought by a judicial authority; and 
that no new evidence be provided since blacklisting.
105  See part 4A for further developments.
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3. Analysis
The approach followed by the ECtHR in the Nada case is promis-
ing and follows quite successfully the current trend of judgments which 
challenge the national implementation of targeted sanctions, without ad-
dressing the source of these human rights violations. 
The Court reviewed carefully the measures taken by Switzerland, 
acknowledging that they stemmed from UNSC resolutions, but in prac-
tice found a way, through determining some latitude in implementation, 
to avoid applying the hierarchy of norms. The ECtHR managed to adapt 
the approach it took in the Al Jedda case to a situation where all other in-
stances had judged that no margin for manoeuvre existed for the states. 
It hence reinforced its case law which promotes the systemic interpreta-
tion of norms and the harmonious implementation of measures.
Nevertheless, the conclusion that Switzerland had some fl exibility 
in its implementation has been criticised. In concurring opinions, four 
judges pointed out that ‘where appropriate’ referred to the choice between 
a legislative and an administrative measure, and hence did not give the 
states much latitude.106 It was also remarked that the use of ‘necessary’ 
was only made in reference to an exemption.107 Finally, the freedoms 
taken by Switzerland108 with regards to implementing UNSC resolutions 
do not create a legal margin for manoeuvre in addition to that of exemp-
tions, as was pointed out by three judges.109 
106  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and 
Yudkivska, para 6; Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, part I, para 4.
107  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, part I, para 3.
108  In addition to the suspension of the ban announced by the Parliament, some liberties 
had been taken in the past. Such liberties included granting non-planned exemptions to 
individuals with regard to their frozen accounts, to solve the problem of living costs (‘Second 
Report of the Monitoring Group Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1363 
(2001) and Extended by UNSC Res 1390 (2002)’ (20 September 2002) S/2002/1050 para 
42 as presented in Birkhäuser (n 17) 6. This led the UNSC to create some exemptions to 
the assets freezing sanction (UNSC Res 1452 (20 December 2002)). Similarly, Switzerland 
used to give access to the court to targeted people whose frozen funds were to be transferred 
to the Development Fund for Iraq in order to comment on the freezing sanction or to ask 
for an exemption (‘Verordnung über die Einziehung eingefrorener irakischer Gelder und 
wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen und deren Überweisung an den Development Fund for Iraq’ 
(18 May 2004) 946.206.1 art 2(2), art 3-4. Birkhäuser (n 17) 9-10). It justifi ed this by its 
human rights obligations and by the fact that the measure was of a defi nite character. See 
the commentary of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs on the Implementation 
of the Sanctions against Iraq, as presented in Birkhäuser (n 17) 9-10. Most of these liberties 
were taken before Switzerland joined the UN and thus when it benefi ted from a margin of 
appreciation in its implementation. See Krafft (n 31) 539-540.
109  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and 
Yudkivska, para 7.
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In a way, the approach taken by the ECtHR in this judgment appears 
milder than that of the HRC in the Vinck and Sayadi case and of the ECJ 
in Kadi. Indeed, while the HRC stated that ‘whatever the arguments [of 
the defendant state on the primacy of UNSC resolutions], it is competent 
to consider the compatibility with the Covenant of the national measures 
taken to implement a resolution of the [UNSC]’,110 the ECtHR took notice 
of article 103 but made sure to avoid a confl ict of norms before having to 
apply this provision. It also did not adopt a strong dualist view and made 
clear that ‘the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must 
be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international 
law’.111 It hence acknowledged the ECHR position within international 
law rather than outside it.
In Nada, the ECtHR did not discuss at all the targeted sanctions 
regime, which it could have done through an equivalence test. How-
ever, taking such an approach would have meant criticising the sanc-
tions regime directly, which the Court preferred not to do. If equivalence 
had been assessed, it would have probably been a review of whether 
the UNSC provides equivalent protection of substantive and procedural 
human rights in abstracto and in concreto.112 Beside the controversial 
question of substantive rights,113 there are obviously no satisfactory 
procedural guarantees with regard to the delisting mechanisms avail-
able.114 Even though these mechanisms have been improved, they do 
not amount to an effective review: the Ombudsperson115 cannot revoke 
the Sanctions Committee decisions on (de)listing;116 an independent and 
impartial body is still missing at the UNSC level to determine whether 
a listing is justifi ed and to take the consequent measures of delisting;117 
and the Sanctions Committee is not an impartial organ - the same insti-
tution is responsible for inclusion on, just as it is for removal from, the 
list118 - but rather a politically non-transparent body.119 Hence, human 
110  Sayadi and Vinck (n 7) para 10.6.
111  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 169.
112  Bosphorus (n 60) paras 155-156.
113  Whether the UNSC respects substantive human rights in theory and practice is not set-
tled, but note that the simple pledge for respect of human rights is not suffi cient (Bosphorus 
(n 60) para 160).
114  Bardo Fassbender, ‘Targeted Sanctions and Due Process’ Study commissioned by the 
United Nations Offi ce of Legal Affairs (2006) 6.
115  UNSC Res 1904 (2009).
116  Courts have still found these measures to be below the appropriate guarantees, for 
example in General Court, Kadi II (n 61); Ginkel (n 9) 392.
117  Fassbender (n 114) 8, 31.
118  Dewulf and Pacquée (n 4) 626.
119  Dewulf and Pacquée (n 4) 619, 625; Ginkel (n 9) 392; ECJ, Kadi (n 5) para 323; General 
Court, Kadi II (n 61) para 128.
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rights protection in the international sanctions regime is not equivalent 
to that under the ECHR. 
4. Alleged infringements of human rights 
Before the ECtHR, Mr Nada alleged that the right to liberty and se-
curity, the right to respect for private life and family, freedom of religion, 
the prohibition of torture and the right to an effective remedy - to com-
plain about the violations of articles 3, 5, 8 and 9 - had been breached. 
The Court could have decided to examine other possible breaches of the 
ECHR. However, here, the right to property and freedom of movement are 
not applicable because Switzerland has never ratifi ed Protocols 1 and 4, 
and a fair trial is not directly relevant.120
The fact that Mr Nada was delisted after the case had been lodged 
was argued by Switzerland as a reason to strike it out, on the basis that 
‘the matter has been resolved’.121 However, the ECtHR sees the loss of 
victim status as still requiring the recognition of a violation and some 
redress,122 and neither has been provided to Mr Nada. Indeed Switzer-
land has not acknowledged a breach of its obligations or offered any re-
dress.123 Even though it did not mention it in the present case, it is also 
worth noting that the Court tends not to be opposed to giving decisions 
of principle, having stated several times that ‘its judgments serve not 
only to decide those cases brought before it but, more generally, to eluci-
date, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention’.124 
A. Right to private and family life - Article 8
Mr Nada argued that the ban of entry and transit through Switzer-
land violated his right to private life, including family life and profes-
sional life.125 Then he focused on two particular aspects, the fi rst being 
that because he could not transit through Switzerland, he was not able 
to go to meet his family.126 Second, he declared that his honour and 
120  If the measures taken against Mr Nada had been civil or criminal charges, he would 
have benefi ted from all procedural rights encompassed in the concept of fair trial. Mr Nada 
did not mention this provision in his application, probably because the national act impos-
ing sanctions against him is of administrative nature; sanctions were not the consequence 
of civil or criminal charges. He appealed against the measures to Swiss Courts and fair trial 
rights were respected in these procedures.
121  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 126; ECHR art 37(1)(b).
122  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 128.
123  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 129.
124  Konstantin Markin v Russia App no 30078/06 (ECHR 7 October 2010) para 39.
125  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 149.
126  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 156.
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reputation had been damaged by the addition of his name on the list an-
nexed to the Swiss ordinance.127 No further mentions were made of his 
professional life.
The Court judged that Switzerland violated article 8 with regard to 
Mr Nada’s private life. It fi rst evaluated that, in view of the particular 
circumstances of Campione, the ban on entry into or transit through 
Switzerland made it diffi cult for the applicant to stay in contact with 
friends and family living elsewhere and constituted an interference with 
Mr Nada’s right to respect for his private and family life.128
Having acknowledged that the restrictions imposed were pursuing 
legitimate aims - to prevent crime and contribute to national security129 
- the Court then examined whether such interference was justifi ed and 
in particular necessary in a democratic society. Taking into account the 
particulars of the case - the nature of Campione as an enclave, the dura-
tion of the measures, the age and health of Mr Nada - the ECtHR consid-
ered that Switzerland had not done all it could have done to harmonise 
its obligations under the UNC and under the ECHR. In particular, it was 
criticised for its refusals of exemption, the lack of assistance offered to 
Mr Nada to apply for exemptions decided by the Sanctions Committee, 
the lack of contact taken to encourage Italy to request a delisting and 
the fact that it did not inform the Sanctions Committee, for over 4 years, 
that an investigation about Mr Nada had been closed because it had been 
found inconclusive.130 In the words of the Court: 
the respondent State could not validly confi ne itself to relying on 
the binding nature of Security Council resolutions, but should have 
persuaded the Court that it had taken - or at least had attempted 
to take - all possible measures to adapt the sanctions regime to the 
applicant’s individual situation.131
It is generally accepted that the right to have one’s reputation pro-
tected is part of the right to private life,132 also when the authority behind 
the publication of certain information is the state.133 That the inclusion 
of Mr Nada’s name on the Swiss ordinance had negative effects on his 
reputation is very likely, as it made him a suspected terrorist.134 However, 
127  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 157.
128  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) paras 165-166.
129  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 174.
130  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) paras 188-195.
131  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 196.
132  Pfeifer v Austria App no 12556/03 (ECHR 15 November 2007) para 35.
133  Z v Finland App no 22009/93 (ECHR 25 February 1997).
134  Cameron (n 23) 188; Ginkel (n 9) 325.
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the Court decided not to consider the damages to Mr Nada’s honour as a 
separate complaint regarding the violation of article 8.135 
This has been criticised by four judges in two concurring opinions. 
Judges Rozakis, Spielmann and Berro-Lefevre declared that this aspect 
should have been assessed in the general discussion on the violation of 
article 8 since the damage to Mr Nada’s honour and reputation was part 
of the complainant’s main arguments.136 The approach chosen by the 
Court leads to the unsatisfactory conclusion that honour and reputa-
tion ‘do not necessarily belong to the hard core of the constitutive parts 
of private life’.137 As for Judge Malinverni, he was of the opinion that the 
decision of the Court was unsatisfactory and that a separate examina-
tion with regard to honour and reputation would have been needed. He 
pointed out that, while the alleged breach examined by the Court was 
based on the particulars of Campione, the examination of the damage to 
Mr Nada’s honour and reputation would have been more general,138 and 
hence perhaps the source of a complex but interesting discussion on the 
impact of a listing on honour and reputation.139
B. Effective remedy - article 13
The characteristics of an effective remedy is that it must be effective 
in both law and practice,140 ‘effectiveness encompassing a remedy that 
can prevent the alleged violation or its continuation, or one which can 
provide adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred’.141 
This provision is not an autonomous article; it has to be combined with 
other rights as the effective remedy is linked to the potential violation of 
a right under the Convention. However, allegation of another violation of 
a right only needs to be reasonably defendable for article 13 to come into 
play.142 
In the present case, since a violation of article 8 has been found, 
the complaint under article 13 is arguable.143 Mr Nada was given neither 
135  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 199.
136  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis joined by Judges Spiel-
mann and Berro-Lefevre.
137  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Concurring Opinion of Judge Rozakis joined by Judges Spiel-
mann and Berro-Lefevre.
138  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, part V paras 28-
29.
139  As was found in Sayadi and Vinck (n 7) para 10.12.
140  Kudla v Poland App no 30210/96 (ECHR 26 October 2000) para 157.
141  Harris (n 68) 562 restating Kudla v Poland (n 140) para 158.
142  Boyle and Rice v UK App no 9659-8/82 (1988) Series A no 131 para 53. 
143  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 209.
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the opportunity nor the forum to have the substance of his case re-
viewed.144 Swiss tribunals did look at his case, but only to conclude that 
they could go no further than to state the primacy of UNSC resolutions 
and to verify, in the case of the Federal Court, jus cogens and margin of 
appreciation. Consequently, at the Swiss level, review options were open, 
but not effi cient, since no institution found itself competent to challenge 
the sanctions. The Court further declared ‘that there was nothing in 
the Security Council resolutions to prevent the Swiss authorities from 
introducing mechanisms to verify the measures taken at national level 
pursuant to those resolutions.’145
C. Right to liberty and security - Article 5 paras 1 and 4
Mr Nada asserted that, because of the ban on entry into or transit 
through Switzerland, he was not able to leave Campione, an Italian en-
clave of 1.6 km2 within Switzerland, and thus was deprived of his liberty, 
a right guaranteed under Article 5 of the ECHR.146
The aspects usually examined by the Court include ‘the type, du-
ration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in ques-
tion’.147 This was acknowledged in the present case and the Court con-
sidered that while the restrictions were applied for a long period of time 
and that Campione is a small territory, Mr Nada’s right to liberty was 
not breached.148 Indeed, the territory into which he could not enter was 
that of a third state, which had every right to control its borders.149 Also, 
Mr Nada had decided to live in Campione150 which was his choice of resi-
dence,151 he lived in his own home and was free to move within the limits 
of the territory. In addition, he had no report to make to the police, was 
144  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 210.
145  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 212.
146  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 215.
147  Guzzardi v Italy App no 7367/76 (1980) Series A no 39 para 92; Harris (n 68) 123. 
These criteria are then weighed on a case-by-case basis: ie in Guzzardi the applicant’s right 
to liberty was breached because he had to spend 16 months on a small island, reporting 
twice per day. In Raimondo v Italy App no 12954/87 (1994) Series A no 281A, the measures 
decided by the state, including a couvre-feu, notifying the police when leaving home and 
reporting on some days, were only seen as a restriction to the freedom of movement. 
148  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) paras 226, 229, 230, 233.
149  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 229.
150  The particularity of Campione as an enclave had already been addressed by the Com-
mission which considered that someone who lives in such a territory and is not allowed to 
enter into the bordering country is not deprived of their liberty. See Jean-Loup Charrier, 
Code de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme (Litec2005) 60 concerning SF v 
Switzerland App no 16360/90 (2 March 1994) 76B DR 13 (decision on admissibility).
151  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 229.
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not under surveillance and was able to receive visits.152 Finally, the pos-
sibility existed in the sanctions regime that exemptions be granted.153 
Hence, the ECtHR concluded that Mr Nada was not deprived of his lib-
erty.
D. Freedom of religion - article 9
Mr Nada further alleged a breach of article 9. Freedom of religion 
includes the freedom to ‘manifest one’s religion alone and in private or in 
community with others’.154 Mr Nada could not do the latter because there 
was no mosque in Campione.
Mr Nada also alleged that he was treated in a manner violating arti-
cle 3. For actions to amount to degrading treatment, they must ‘humiliate 
or debase an individual showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his 
or her human dignity and arouse a feeling of fear, anguish or inferiority 
capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance’.155 
The Court did not address the substance of these allegations and 
concluded that they were ill-founded.156 
5. Conclusion
The Nada case arrived before the ECtHR after several other related 
cases on obligations stemming from UNSC resolutions. It was the fi rst 
occurrence for this Court to examine targeted sanctions and their im-
pact on the human rights of listed individuals. It is certainly a milestone, 
showing not only the trend favoured by the ECtHR in this complex mat-
ter but also reinforcing its systemic interpretation approach in dealing 
with fragmentation in international law.
The ECtHR declared that it was competent to review the national 
implementation of UNSC resolutions. Considering that Switzerland had 
some latitude in implementation, the Court judged that the respond-
ent state could have found ways to mitigate the encroachment on hu-
man rights. Indeed, due to the very intrusive measures taken against 
Mr Nada, the Swiss authorities should have applied the existing exemp-
tions as generously as possible. Also, Switzerland should have transmit-
ted the lack of fi ndings of its investigation to the Sanctions Committee 
152  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 231.
153  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 232.
154  Religionsgemeinschaft der Zeugen Jehovas and others v Austria App no 40825/98 (ECHR 
31 July 2008) para 61.
155  Pretty v UK App no 2346/02 (ECHR 29 April 2002) para 52.
156  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) para 237.
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and should have supported Mr Nada in his undertakings.157 Hence, the 
Court found that the entry and transit ban as implemented by Swit-
zerland violated Mr Nada’s right to private and family life. The right to 
an effective remedy was also breached, on account of the lack of review 
mechanism able or willing to examine the substance of Mr Nada’s al-
legations.
Some aspects of the judgment or silences therein can be questioned, 
such as the real latitude Switzerland had in implementing the resolu-
tions. It can also be regretted that no mention of equivalence was made. 
Finally, due to the mild approach taken, the Court is at risk of criticism, 
such as that made by Judge Malinverni when he asked: 
should the Court, as guarantor of respect for human rights in Eu-
rope, not be more audacious than the European Court of Justice 
or the Human Rights Committee when it comes to addressing and 
settling the sensitive issue of confl ict of norms that underlies the 
present case?158 
Rather than pointing out what the Court has not achieved, one 
could also look at what it has done. It is indeed positive that, even though 
the reasoning of the ECtHR and that of the HRC or the ECJ differ, their 
conclusions tend to coincide. In Europe, currently, issuing contradictory 
judgments in similar cases would cause issues of consistency. It is true 
that the ECtHR is under no obligation to follow the ECJ case law - the 
reverse might also be true once the EU accedes to the ECtHR.159 How-
ever, in the meanwhile, a non-opposing body of jurisprudence is quite 
crucial,160 not only for future EU accession to the ECHR, but also for the 
coherence of overlapping legal orders.161
Moreover, the ECtHR showed strong willingness in the Al-Jedda 
case to fi nd an innovative way to overcome the negative consequences of 
a fragmented legal order. It confi rmed this approach of harmonious in-
157  The conclusions reached by the ECtHR and the Swiss Federal Court differ, but the na-
tional court did comment on the need to forward the results of the national investigation to 
the Sanctions Committee and, in view of the intrusiveness of the measures, to apply exemp-
tions generously. See Nada gegen SECO (n 39) paras 9.2 and 10.2 as presented in Nada v 
Switzerland (n 38) paras 51-52.
158  Nada v Switzerland (n 38) Concurring Opinion of Judge Malinverni, part III para 20.
159  Lisbon Treaty art 6 II; ECHR art 59(2) (as modifi ed by Protocol 14).
160  It is true that the ECJ could reverse its jurisprudence, but for the time being ECJ, Kadi 
(n 5) has already served as a precedent (Case T-318/01 Omar Mohammed Othman Founda-
tion v Council and Commission, 11 June 2009, OJ C180/37; see Hovell (n 80)).
161  Switzerland is only member of the CoE; it would thus not face any problems if the two 
highest courts of the European area disagreed. This would be more complicated for mem-
bers of the EU.
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terpretation and implementation of international obligations in the Nada 
case. It is a sign that a middle ground between complete submission to 
the UNSC and questioning the hierarchical role given to the UNSC can 
be found in order to ensure the protection of human rights. Ultimately, 
systemic interpretation is a workable solution to face the more general 
issue of fragmentation and as such is a positive tool in balancing rights 
and obligations that national and international courts are increasingly 
asked to perform.

